Voluntary Manslaughter legal definition

Voluntary Manslaughter:
- Voluntary manslaughter (V MS): an intentional killing in the heat of passion with adequate
cause.
o Provocation (aka heat of passion): can negate malice, or may be considered in addition
to malice. There can be no cooling period; restraint over time can negate provocation.
Many think V must responsible for it; it’s not just that you’re mad – it matters at whom.
o Adequate cause: includes serious assault/battery, sudden discovery of adultery, resistance
of illegal arrest, injury/serious abuse of a relative. Doesn’t include minor abuse, receiving
info about but not seeing adultery, adultery of fiancé/unmarried sex partner, words alone.
o The MPC instead uses extreme emotional disturbance with reasonable explanation/
excuse, a much broader, more subjective standard re: both the disturbance and the V.
o There used to be a standard that looked at the circumstances as D believed them to be, but
that has largely been discredited as being too broad.
- Even if malice aforethought would otherwise be present b/c killing is intentional, PA
pattern reduces the grade to V MS for certain killings in the heat of passion. The underlying
theory varies: some say it’s b/c malice aforethought is absent in such cases due to passion, others
treat passion as a kind of defense that reduces the grade.
- But not every passion killing qualifies as V MS, some are still M. Factors considered include:
o The adequacy/reasonableness of provocation.
o The severity of mental disturbance such that it’d interfere w/“cool reflection” (sometimes
RP standard)
o Timing: was it on the spot, or done later? Latter is murder.
o V: some cts insist it must be someone involved in creating the passion for it to be V MS.
o The judge must submit instructions on voluntary manslaughter if the possibility is raised
by the evidence (ex. sleeping w/D’s wife immediately prior to killing).
- Generally, trial judge must submit jury instruction if any reasonable juror could conclude that the
facts support the theory presented by the party requesting it.
- In some jurisdictions, the passion element of MS negates malice, in others it’s a separate element
coexisting w/malice, but lowering the crime’s severity.
- Voluntary MS is only appropriate when one kills upon reasonable provocation or adequate cause
(see Avery), based on different standards employed in different jurisdictions:
o Categorical approach: certain categories, and those only, are sufficient to constitute legal
provocation (ex. adultery).
o Reasonable person (RP): the more RP’s like D, the more likely it’ll be considered V MS.
o Battered Spouse Syndrome (BSS).
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- The MPC instead has only one category of MS, which can be committed either by a reckless
killing or under the influence of extreme mental/emotional disturbance for which there’s
reasonable explanation or excuse as evaluated by the viewpoint of one in D’s situation under the
circumstances as he believed them (subjective).
- In many jurisdictions, the prosecution must not only prove the killing BARD, but also must
negate voluntary MS BARD.
- State v. Avery (Missouri Sup Ct, 2003): D’s lover had harassed her and her BF. She knew he
wasn’t sober, and when he returned to her BF’s home after she’d asked him to leave, looking
mad. He threatened and quickly walked toward her, so D shot him. Held that the trial ct erred in
failing to include instructions on V MS because the jury could’ve reasonably believed that’s
what this was. Rule: for MS, while sudden passion isn’t established when D had ample time to
cool down, evidence of a past relationship/conduct may be relevant to show why otherwise
seemingly minor conduct may have caused D to kill, showing a rekindling of provocation after
what might be thought of as a cooling period. When in doubt, cts should instruct on the lesser-
included offense, leaving it to the jury to decide of which offense (if any) D is guilty.
- People v. Page (IL Sup Ct, 2000): D alleged V made a same-sex sexual advance toward him,
which caused him to kill V. Held that mere evidence of an alleged homosexual advance
precipitating a killing does not constitute provocation as to compel voluntary MS instructions.
Depraved-Heart Murder - Malice Aforethought in Unintentional Killings:
- Depraved-Heart Murder (2nd M): murder that’s unintentional but malice is implied b/c D
killed V acting so recklessly as to show w/a depraved heart / extreme indifference to life. If
D’s recklessness is less substantial, the lesser charge of involuntary MS may apply.
- How to distinguish b/t DHM and I MS (both involve extreme recklessness):
- Common law recognized many kinds of implied malice, arising w/o intent to kill:
o Degree of risk
o Justification for risk
o D’s awareness of risk (v. negligence)
o Depraved heart malice.
o Assault w/intent to cause serious bodily injury, even if there was no intent to kill (idea
that intending serious injury is guilt enough if death actually results, anything else would
depreciate actual murders w/o significant gain in crime grading to the benefit of those
whose intent was worth of severe condemnation anyways). See State v. Jensen. Some US
jurisdictions don’t recognize this kind of malice, however, so it’s not enough for murder.
o If D resisted unlawful arrest so as to kill the arresting officer, even unintentionally. See
Donehy v. Commonwealth. But all US cases also contain facts that supply malice in
another way and in cases where this has made the difference, US cts appear to have
rejected this kind of malice.
o Killings in the commission of certain felonies (aka felony murder). This is alive and well
in the US today, and used often.
- Commonwealth v. Malone (PA, 1946): 13yo D put gun against V’s head to play “Russian
Poker,” pulled the trigger 3 times, the last shot fired, killed V. D said he put the bullet in the slot
to the right of the firing chamber, didn’t think it’d go off, didn’t mean to hurt V. Held that as
long as there was an intent to act in a manner that displays gross recklessness for which one
might reasonably anticipate death to another is likely, intent to kill is not necessary for one to be
found guilty of 2nd M. However, an accident that is a non-depraved result isn’t M.
- United States v. Fleming (US COA 4th Cir, 1984): drunk D drove incredibly recklessly (way
over the limit, veering into the oncoming lane to skirt traffic), lost control, hit and killed V. Held
that a non-purposeful vehicular homicide can amount to murder if P can prove D intended to
operate his car how he did w/o regard for others’ safety or lives. No intent to kill is required, if
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there’s depraved disregard for human life. Malice can be established by evidence of
conduct that’s reckless, wanton, a gross deviation from RP standard.
- Thomas v. State (NV, 2004): rejected challenge to a murder conviction based on depraved heart
instruction, alleging that term is archaic, not rational, pejorative.