Involuntary Manslaughter and Negligent Homicide

Involuntary Manslaughter and Negligent Homicide:
- Involuntary Manslaughter (I MS): killing someone recklessly or negligently. Under PA
pattern, unintentional killings less serious than depraved heart M can be classified as I MS.
- Criminally negligent homicide (CNH): many states define this crime covering offenses that are
criminally negligent rather than reckless, depending on D’s conscious mental state. Depends on
the foreseeability, degree, and probability of risk. Generally requires greater guilt than civil tort
negligence, a gross deviation from ordinary conduct. See Robertson.
- Recklessness: awareness of unacceptable risk to human life.
- Negligence: lack of such awareness in a situation where D should’ve been aware (RP standard).
o There’s no contributory negligence in crim law.
o Juries can refuse to believe D’s claim of ignorance, infer knowledge from circumstances.
- MPC is much simpler, gets rid of malice and premeditation / deliberation b/c as the sole
determinant of severity it created a false dichotomy b/c some thoughtless murders are worse than
some planned ones (might create backwards results).
- MPC’s “extreme mental or emotional disturbance” expands the traditional voluntary MS
conception (no more cooling time, provocation). It also limits mens rea to purposeful, knowing,
reckless, or negligent behavior.
o Purposefully: it’s D’s conscious object to engage in such behavior, affect such result. D
is either aware of or hopes for attendant circumstances.
o Knowingly: D is aware that conduct is of a certain nature or that circumstances exist.
o Recklessly: D consciously disregards a substantial, unjustifiable risk in a way that’s a
gross deviation from the law-abiding person.
o Negligently: D should know of such risk.
- Commonwealth v. Feinberg (PA, 1969): held that D’s sale of a reformulated, more dangerous
form of Sterno to ppl he knew were likely to try to extract the ethanol to drink it, aware that
death was likely, constituted I MS. Rule: to sustain a MS conviction, P must present evidence
proving D acted rashly or recklessly, showing disregard / indifference to human life /
consequence in comparison to a reasonable person.
- Robertson v. Commonwealth (KY Sup Ct 2002): held that where a cop fell through a gap on a
bridge to his death while chasing D running from him, this constituted involuntary 2nd degree
MS. Rule: it’s 2nd MS if D was aware of and consciously disregarded a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that his conduct would result in another’s death, this disregard
constituting a gross deviation from RP standard. It is CNH if D failed to perceive such risk.
o Concurrence: whether fleeing arrest that results in a cop’s death alone supports 2nd MS is
open, but here D was aware of the gap and disregarded it, and had to know V would
follow him and thereby be at substantial, unjustified risk.
- State v. Rivera: 2 brothers kill another man (with no apparent prior deliberation). One shot him 3
times, the other stabbed him 6 times. Rule: When one acts with intent to cause serious bodily
injury, he;s liable for murder, no matter if it was his act that caused the death (MPC approach).
- Martinez v. State: D killed V, but stated he did so because V had tried to accost him and he had
no intent to kill V, so he should only be guilty of manslaughter. D admitted he had tried to hurt
V with the knife. Rule: A D who acts with intent to cause serious bodily injury is liable for
murder, even if D had no intent to cause the death.
- People v. Hall: see section on Mens Rea below. Skier case.
Felony Murder:
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- The felony murder rule: common law imputed malice to killing during a felony (even if it
was an accident). A shortcut to proving M. Requires proof that the felony or D’s conduct
caused the death (some states allow but for causation, others limit by proximate cause). Felony +
causation of death = FM. Most states still have it but due to concerns about overbroad
application, however, the rule has since been limited:
- Causation and FM:
o The inherently dangerous felony approach: some states (like CA) require that the
underlying felony be inherently dangerous in the abstract (this is subjective), looking
only at its dangerousness w/o considering D’s conduct in the individual case.
o The dangerous act approach: requires independent proof that this individual D performed
some act “dangerous to human life” during commission of the felony. Focuses on D’s
conduct in the particular case.
o Merger doctrine: most states exclude lesser degrees of H as predicate felonies (ex. MS),
b/c otherwise every killing would be M. So, MS can’t support FM under this theory.
Some states allow assault to be the predicate felony, others don’t.
o The MPC doesn’t have it. They thought it inappropriate to convict for M on a lesser
mental degree of fault. It does, however, contain a presumption of extreme indifference,
sufficient for M, in the case of some violent felonies, but preserves this ? as a jury issue.
o Cause in fact approach: sets a relatively low proof standard, b/c whenever death results
and wouldn’t have occurred w/o the felony, this is present.
o Proximate causation: as a result of the low proof standard for cause in fact, many states
also require this, which places a more substantial restriction on the FM doctrine, existing
only when there is foreseeability.
o Causation issues become tricky when someone who’s not the V of the underlying felony
is killed accidentally (ex. a co-felon or cop).
ƒ Agency approach: holds D liable only for killings committed by his co-felon,
ƒ Proximate causation approach: might hold D liable for death of a co-felon on
who’s treated as D’s agent, and not for a killing of his co-felon by a cop, who’s
not D’s agent. See Sophopohone.
grounds that it’s a foreseeable result of the cone of violence set in motion by D’s
participation in the underlying felony.
- There is great debate as to whether felony murder can be based on assault. People v. Ireland
(CA) says no, Wyman v. State (GA) says yes.
- Cts have typically been willing to impose FM liability in cases when D’s co-felon uses an
innocent person as a hostage or shield and someone accidentally kills that person.
- State v. Anderson (MN Sup Ct, 2002): D brought a loaded gun to V’s house, telling V and a 3rd
party he’d stolen it. They checked it out, remarked that it was loaded, gave it back to D. When V
knelt to put CDs into his stereo, D pointed the gun at V’s head and it discharged. Held that felon
in possession and possession of a stolen firearm can be legal predicates for felony murder under
certain circumstances. Rule: even when D doesn’t commit M to further any of the underlying
felonies, he can still be guilty of felony murder under the dangerous act approach where he has
acted in an inherently dangerous manner in the commission of his crime. The pointing of a
loaded, unsecured gun at another in close range qualifies.
o Dissent: the FM doctrine is an anomaly in H law, expresses a highly artificial concept
shouldn’t be extended beyond it’s required application. Here, the predicate offenses
weren’t inherently dangerous and the act causing V’s death wasn’t committed in
furtherance of the underlying felony. Traditionally, the doctrine had a critical limitation
of requiring proof of a causal relationship b/t the predicate offense and V’s death. This
decision gives the state unlimited discretion to apply the rule.
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- People v. Hansen (1994): rejected an argument that a drive-by wasn’t felony murder b/c it
necessitates a high probability of death and occupants could’ve been absent, b/c there’s always a
significant likelihood they’ll be present. Held that the crime of discharging a firearm at an
inhabited dwelling doesn’t merge w/a resulting H, will support a conviction for 2nd FM.
- Commonwealth v. Kilburn (Mass Sup Jud ct, 2003): D wasn’t there for V’s shooting, but was
later linked to a conspiracy to punish/discipline V. D confessed to this, but said that the gunman
had just gone there to ‘do’ V, who never should’ve died. Held that here the merger doctrine
didn’t prevent D’s M conviction since the armed-assault predicate felony also caused V’s death.
Rule: under the FM doctrine, where there’s a felony separate from the acts of violence that
constitute a necessary part of the H itself, one can be convicted of FM, even if there was another
predicate felony that is merged. Also, the law doesn’t require D to be present or intend V’s death
to be guilty of FM.
- State v. Sophophone (KS Sup Ct, 2001): D and 3 others broke into a home, which the resident
reported. Cops responded, D began to run away, was arrested. One of the others also began to
run, a cop followed him, and when the he raised his weapon and fired, the cop did the same and
killed him. Held that where a killing resulted from the lawful acts of a cop in attempting to
apprehend a co-felon, D is not criminally responsible for the death of such co-felon. The
FM doctrine doesn’t apply when the fatal act is performed by a non-felon. (Never actually
says it adopts the agency approach).
o Dissent: the statute doesn’t contain the limitations supposed by the majority, and nothing
requires the ct to adopt the agency approach. D set in motion the acts that would’ve killed
the cop had he not been so alert, and so should apply also to the co-felon. This is exactly
what the legislature had in mind when it adopted the FM rule.
- Santana v. Kuhlman upheld the use of FM re: when one cop shot another in the course of an
undercover drug arrest during which Santana produced a chaotic gun battle.